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1 Introduction: The UK and Terrorism 
 
The UK has a long history of terrorism law and practice both at home, particularly in 
Northern Ireland,1 and abroad in its former colonial empire.2 Its domestic anti–terrorism 
law is wide-ranging and highly sophisticated3 and its anti-terrorism practices and policies 
continue to attract great interest,4 as do the leading judicial decisions.5 This article seeks 
to assess the application of a number of anti-terrorism strategies involving detention of 
individuals. Part 2 briefly introduces the legal and human rights context. Parts 3 consider 
the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001 on indefinite 
detention. Part 4 examines the judicial responses to those provisions. Part 5 examines the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and in particular details the regime of control orders it 
introduced. The regime of control orders can only be properly understood as a response 
to the judicial rejection of the regime of indefinite detention. Parts 6-8 examine the 
judicial challenges to control orders to date. These have concerned procedure (Part 6), 
substance (Part 7) and relating to the possibility of prosecution (Part 8). Part 9 contains 
some concluding comments on the future for Control Orders. It considers suggestions 
that have been made for improving the control orders regime and how the regime may be 
impacted by developments in other anti-terrorist strategies. The Control Order regime is 
important internationally because it represents the current UK strategy for dealing with 
individuals who have been returned from other jurisdictions, for example, from the 
United States.6 
                                                 
* Professor of Public International Law, Liverpool Law School. 
1 See P Wilkinson (ed) Terrorism: British Perspectives (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993). 
2 See C Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford, OUP, 
2002); C Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century 
(London, Faber, 1986). 
3 Some aspects of domestic law have been required by legal obligations under European 
and international law. See H Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of 
International Law (Cambridge, 2005); F Gregory, ‘The EU’s Response to 9/11: A Case 
Study of Institutional Roles and Policy Processes with Special Reference to Issues of 
Accountability and Human Rights’ 17 Terrorism and Political Violence (2005) 105-23. 
4 See C Walker, ‘Policy Options and Priorities: British Perspective’ in M van Leeuwen 
(ed) Confronting Terrorism: European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies (The 
Hague, Kluwer, 2003) 11; A Vercher, Terrorism in Europe (Oxford, OUP, 1992). 
5 ‘the decision in the A case [considered below] is a landmark decision that will be used 
as a point of reference by courts all over the world for decades to come, even when the 
age of terrorism has passed’, M Arden, ‘Human Rights in The Age of Terrorism’ 121 
LQR (2005) 604-27 at 621. 
6 See I. Cobain and V. Dodd, ‘Britain to US: we don't want Guantánamo nine back’ The 
Guardian, 3 October 2006; S. O’Neill, M. Evans and T. Reid, ‘Release of inmates from 
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2 The Legislative and Human Rights Context  
 
 
2.1 Human Rights Act 1998 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), most of which entered into force in October 2000, 
was a major constitutional development.7 The HRA ‘incorporates’8 the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law. All legislation can now be tested for 
its tested for its compatibility with the ECHR. The HRA represents an ingenious 
construction that impacts on legislative, executive and judicial powers and involves all 
institutional actors in rights review.9 Under s. 3 HRA all legislation must ‘so far as it is 
possible to do so’ be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the ECHR10 It 
if is not possible, the higher courts can issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ under s 4 
HRA. In all cases so far these have been followed by remedial legislation. Under s 6 
HRA it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention rights.11 
 
2.2 Controlling the Terror Threat: Anti-Terrorist Legislation in the UK 
 
Major terrorist atrocities almost always see new legislative provisions in response to 
public demand. After 9/11 the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) 
(ATCSA)12 was passed with great speed.13 It contained an array of new offences and new 
                                                                                                                                                 
Guantanamo leaves Britain facing a security headache’ The Times, 8 August 2007 (if five 
Guantanamo Bay inmates were returned to Britain they would be placed under 
surveillance and could have terrorist control orders imposed on them if they are thought 
to be a threat to national security. Conderation would also be given to their deportation). 
7 See D McGoldrick, ‘The HRA in Theory and Practice’ 50 ICLQ (2001) 901-53.  
8 It is not a technical ‘incorporation’ as the ECHR is not per se part of UK law. 
9 See D Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Processes’ Legal 
Studies [1999] 165-206; P Craig, ‘The Courts, the Human Rights Act and Judicial 
Review’ 117 LQR (2001) 589-603; D Nicol, ‘Are Convention Rights a No-Go Area For 
Parliament’ [2002] Public Law 438-48. 
10 See A Kavanagh, ‘The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the 
Human Rights Act 1998’ 26(1) OJLS (2006) 179-206; TRS Allen, ‘Legislative 
Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning and Authority’ 63(3) 
Cambridge Law Journal (2004) 685-711; R Ekins, ‘Constitutional Law, Judicial 
Supremacy and the Rule of Law’ 119 LQR (2003) 127-152. 
11 S 6 details the scope of ‘public authority’. It includes the courts but not the parliament. 
12 See A Tomkins, ‘Legislating Against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act’ [2002] Public Law 205. 
13 See PA Thomas, ‘September 11th and Good Governance’ 53 NILQ (2002) 366; ‘JL 
Hiebert, ‘Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures’ 68 MLR (2005) 676-80. 
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powers.14 The most controversial new measures in the ATCSA were those in Part 4, titled 
‘Immigration and Asylum’, permitting indefinite detention for foreign nationals 
suspected of being international terrorists.15 These provisions required the UK to derogate 
from Article 5 ECHR and Article 9 ICCPR.16  
 
3 The ATSCA Part 4 Regime for Indefinite Detention 
 
Section 21 of ATCSA provided that the Home Secretary could certify an individual if he 
reasonably believed that that person’s presence in the UK was a threat to national security 
and that he suspected that the person was a terrorist. Once certified a range of 
immigration decisions (which can only be taken against non-nationals), including an 
order for removal, could be taken even though the person could not be removed for legal 
or practical reasons. Interestingly, the principal legal reason would normally be that it 
was contrary to the ECHR to remove an individual who presented substantial evidence 
that he or she would face a real risk of treatment incompatible with the ECHR.17 In the 
anti-terrorist context this would normally be ill-treatment or the death penalty but in 
principle it could extend to other rights.18 Seventeen persons were detained under Part 4 
regime.19 Only one person won an appeal against certification. In March 2004 the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled that the assessments placed before it for 
detaining a Libyan man as a ‘suspected international terrorist were not reliable’ and that 
reasonable suspicion had not been established.  The Court of Appeal upheld SIAC’s 
decision.20 There was particular controversy in 2006 when it, ‘emerged that lawyers 
                                                 
14 Eg there were provisions on the disclosure of information, policing of nuclear and 
aviation facilities, retention of communications data, EU third pillar provisions. On the 
latter see D Bonner, ‘Managing Terrorism While Respecting Human Rights? European 
Aspects of the ATCSA 2001’ 8 European Public Law (2002) 497. 
15 Eg on a sunset provision and on reviews. For the detailed provisions see H Fenwick, 
‘The ATCSA 2001: The “Response” of Great Britain’s Legal Order to September 11, 
2001: Conflicts With Fundamental Rights’, in P Eden and T O’Donnell, September 11, 
2001: A Turning Point in International and Domestic Law? (Transnational, Ardsley, NY, 
2005) (eds) 533-613 at 544-604. 
16 See generally C Mikaelson, ‘Derogating From International Human Rights Obligations 
in the “War Against Terrorism” - A British-Australian Perspective’ 17 Terrorism and 
Political Violence (2005) 131-55. 
17 It could also have been that they satisfied the criteria for being granted asylum. 
18 The House of Lords has held that a person may rely not only on Articles 2 and 3 ECHR 
but also 5, 6, 8 and possibly 9 to resist a decision to remove them to a state where 
anticipated ill treatment would or might result in the completely denial or nullification/  
of those Convention rights, see R (Razgar) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(No. 2) [2004] UKHL 27, [2004] 2 AC 368 and in R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator 
[2004] UKHL 26, [2004] 2 AC 323. 
19 For details of their national origin and the allegations against them see ‘Who are the 
terror detainees?’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk> 11 March 2005. 
20 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v M [2004] EWCA Civ 324, [2004] 2 
All E.R. 863. See also A & Others v State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 
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discovered that material presented by the intelligence services in his case contradicted 
evidence given in another appeal. The discrepancy led to severe criticism of the Home 
Office by SIAC judges’.21 
According to Amnesty International most of the ATCSA detainees were held in 
the High Security Unit (HSU) in Belmarsh prison. The HSU was described as a prison 
within the prison. The cells were small with restricted natural light. Detainees were kept 
in their wing and could communicate only with detainees in the same wing, except during 
religious worship. During their initial detention in the HSU, the ATCSA detainees were 
locked in their cells 22 hours a day and in the two hours out of their cell they were 
subjected to ‘small-group isolation’. AI considered that many of these aspects of the HSU 
regime violated international human rights standards: the lack of adequate association 
time and activities in communal areas; the lack of educational, sport, and other 
meaningful activities and facilities; and the lack of access to open air, natural daylight 
and exercise in a larger space. In March 2002 the ATCSA detainees were decategorized 
from Category A ‘high risk’ to Category A ‘standard risk’ and transferred to House Block 
4 in Belmarsh. When Amnesty International delegates visited the detainees in June 2002, 
the detainees said they were still being locked up 22 hours a day; that they were denied 
adequate health care; and that they were only allowed ‘closed’ visits with their families 
(when a glass screen separates the detainee from family). Amnesty International 
concluded that those held at Belmarsh were suffering conditions that amounted to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and that the conditions had led to a serious 
deterioration of their physical and mental health.22 
There was also some evidence that the conditions of detention were causing 
psychiatric problems.23 One was detained in a secure mental hospital; another was 
released on conditional bail because of the deterioration of his mental health while in 
custody. Another was released on bail, on strict conditions, in April 2004. The Home 
Secretary revoked his certification of another in September 2004, and he was released 
without conditions. The remainder were detained in high security jails. The European 
Committee on the Prevention of Torture twice visited persons detained under Part IV of 
ATCSA and made adverse comments the regime.24 Amnesty International condemned it 
as a ‘shadow criminal justice system’.25 Other human rights organisations were heavily 
critical. In a powerfully reasoned report a Committee of Privy Councillors (the Newton 
Committee) ‘strongly recommended’ that the detention power be terminated ‘as a matter 
                                                                                                                                                 
1123 on a number of generic issues dealt with by SIAC. One person was granted bail, see 
G v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 265. 
21 See S O’Neill, ‘Immigration Powers Used To Hold Al-Qaeda Kingpin in Jail’ The 
Times, 20 October 2006. 
22 The information in this paragraph is reproduced from Amnesty International, ‘UK - 
Human Rights: A Broken Promise’ 
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR450042006?open&of=ENG-GBR> (23 
February 2006), p.21. 
23 Id, 21-23. 
24 See CPT/Inf (2003) 18, 9; CPT/Inf (2006) CPT/Inf (2006) 26, 27 28 and 29. 
25 AI Report, Broken Promises, n 23 above, p.15. 
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of urgency’.26 As noted, seventeen people were subjected to the Part IV regime. Legally, 
they could have left at any time (hence it was referred to as a three wall prison) if they 
were willing to return to a place where they were willing to face a real risk of serious ill-
treatment. Although two individuals did just this, it was not realistic to expect detainees 
to do this. By the time of the decision of the House of Lords in the A (Belmarsh 
Detainees) Case those detained had already been held for three and a half years and faced 
the prospect of indefinite detention. 
 
 
4 The Judiciary and Indefinite Detention 
 
The detention system in ATCSA was challenged in A (FC) and Others v Secretary of 
state for the Home Department.27 While ‘Belmarsh [was] not the British Gunatanamo 
Bay’28 there had been strong judicial criticism of the regime at the US base.  
 
4.1 The Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
 
It is important to understand how the issue of indefinite detention came before the 
respective courts. In 1997, the UK authorities established the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC).29 SIAC is an immigration tribunal, empowered to hear 
appeals by foreign nationals against being issued with deportation orders on grounds that 
they pose a threat to the ‘national security’ of the UK, and that their presence in the UK is 
not conducive to the public good. SIAC can conduct ‘closed’ hearings in which the 
deportee and counsel are excluded, and at which the Home Secretary is allowed to 
present secret intelligence information. This is to ensure the protection of ‘national 
security’. Under immigration powers, the UK authorities are entitled to detain people 
pending deportation.30  
 In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman31 the applicant, a 
Pakistani national, had applied for indefinite leave to remain in the UK. This was refused.  
                                                 
26 Privy Counsellor Review Committee, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
Review: Report, House of Commons, HC 100 (2003), paras. 185–204. 
27 [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68. 
28 Baroness Hale, ID, para 223. See also PA Thomas, ‘Emergency and Anti-Terrorist 
Powers: 9/11: USA and UK' (2003) 26 Fordham International Law Journal 1193-1233; 
W Scheuerman, ‘Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law After 9/11’ 14 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy (2006) 61–84. 
29 This was done in response to the adverse judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Chahal v United Kingdom, finding that the safeguards advanced by 
the United Kingdom as affording proper due process standards were inadequate. Neither 
judicial review by the High Court nor the adviser system satisfied art. 5(4) ECHR which 
mandates that the legality of detention must be determined by a ‘court’.  
30 See S O’Neill, ‘Immigration Powers Used To Hold Al-Qaeda Kingpin in Jail’ The 
Times, 20 October 2006.  
31 [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 153. 
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On the basis that the Secretary of State was satisfied, on the basis of the information he 
had received from confidential sources, that R was involved with an Islamic  
terrorist organization. He was satisfied that in the light of R’s association with the 
organization it was undesirable to permit him to remain and that his continued presence 
in this country represents a danger to national security. R challenged the decision before 
SIAC, which allowed his appeal on the basis that that Secretary of State had not 
established that R was, is, and was likely to be a threat to national security. The CA 
allowed the Secretary of state’s appeal and this was upheld by the House of Lords. The 
key focus was on the interpretation of ‘national security’ and ‘in the interests of national 
security’. The HL accepted that the United Kingdom's national security could be 
threatened by action targeted at an altogether different jurisdiction, even if no British 
subjects were directly involved. The determination of the issue of whether something was 
“in the interests” of national security WAS not a question of law, but rather a “matter of 
judgment and policy”.32  
The ATCSA gave SIAC new powers. These included provision for the grant of 
bail (s.24), appeal against certification by a certified suspected international terrorist 
(s.25), periodic reviews of certification (s.26), periodic reviews of the operation of 
sections 21 to 23 (s.28). Section 29 provided for the expiry (subject to periodic renewal) 
of sections 21 to 23 and for the final expiry of those sections, unless renewed, on 10 
November 2006. By section 21(8), legal challenges to certification were reserved to 
SIAC. Habeas corpus was thus excluded. Section 30 gave SIAC exclusive jurisdiction on 
‘derogation matters’, which covered the derogation from Article 5(1) ECHR made by the 
UK. SIAC was designated as the appropriate tribunal to hear a challenge under the HRA 
to the compatibility of the use of derogation power with an applicant’s Convention right. 
SIAC was constituted as a superior court (s.35) and appeals from its decisions under the 
ATCSA lay to the Court of Appeal and House of Lords.  
With respect to certification the only remedy was cancellation of the certificate if 
either the SIAC considered that there were no reasonable grounds for the belief or 
suspicion required under s.21 (a) or (b) or ‘for some other reason’ (s.25 (2)). SIAC could 
appoint an independent lawyer – a Special Advocate - to represent an applicant’s interests 
when considerations of national security meant that the applicant and his lawyers had to 
be excluded from the proceedings while the sensitive evidence was put.33 The Special 
Advocate represents the interests of, but is not responsible for, an appellant. This 
significantly modifies the ordinary lawyer/client relationship. The Special Advocate is 
precluded from communicating highly pertinent information, namely the closed case, to 
the appellant and as a result, the scope of the Special Advocate to receive meaningful 
instructions is limited. Thus, the ability of the appellant, or his solicitor, to make 
informed decisions as how best to proceed is constrained. At any closed session, neither 
the appellant nor his lawyers are permitted to be present and the Special Advocate takes 
over entirely as his representative. They have no power to call witnesses.34 
 
                                                 
32 Lord Hoffman, id para 50.  
33 For a critique see Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC, The Operation of the SIAC 
and the Use of Special Advocates, Seventh Report of Session 2004-05, HC 323-1. 
34 The Special Advocate system was also imported into the PTA 2005. See below Part 00. 
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4.2 Re A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Belmarsh 
Detainees Case) 
 
The nine appellants had been certified by the Home Secretary under s. 21 and detained 
under section 23 of ATSCA.35 They shared certain common characteristics that were 
central to their appeals. All were foreign (non-UK) nationals. None had been the subject 
of any criminal charge.36 In none of their cases was a criminal trial in prospect. The UK 
had derogated from Article 5(1) (f) ECHR.37 The applicants challenged the lawfulness of 
their detention as inconsistent with the ECHR. They argued that the United Kingdom was 
not legally entitled to derogate from its ECHR obligations; that, if it was, its derogation 
was nonetheless inconsistent with the ECHR and so ineffectual to justify the detention; 
and that the statutory provisions under which they had been detained were incompatible 
with their Convention rights. 
SIAC considered a body of closed material, that is, secret material of a sensitive 
nature not shown to the parties. The Court of Appeal (CA) was not asked to read this 
material. Nor was the House of Lords. Before SIAC and the CA the applicants lost on the 
issue of whether there was a public emergency. Before the SIAC they were successful in 
their argument that the provisions of s.23 were discriminatory and so in breach of article 
14 of the Convention. The CA rejected this view.38 Lord Woolf CJ referred to a tension 
between article 15 and article 14 ECHR.39 He held that it would be ‘surprising’ if article 
14 prevented the Secretary of State from restricting his power to detain to a smaller rather 
than a larger group. He held that there was objective and reasonable justification for the 
differential treatment of the appellants.40 Brooke LJ similarly found good objective 
reasons for the Secretary of State's differentiation, although he also relied on rules of 
public international law.41 Chadwick LJ found that since the Secretary of State had 
reached his judgment on what the exigencies of the situation required, his decision had to 
                                                 
35 Two of the eight December detainees exercised their right to leave the United 
Kingdom: one went to Morocco on 22 December 2001, the other (a French as well as an 
Algerian citizen) went to France on 13 March 2002. One of the December detainees was 
transferred to Broadmoor Hospital on grounds of mental illness in July 2002. Another 
was released on bail, on strict conditions, in April 2004. The Home Secretary revoked his 
certification of another in September 2004, and he was released without conditions. 
36
 Although one of the detainees has previously been tried and acquitted of a terrorist 
offence. 
37 See A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, para 11.  
38 A, X and Y, and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1502; [2004] QB 335. 
39 Id para 45. 
40 Id para 56. 
41 Id, paras 112-32. 
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stand. He stated that ‘The decision to confine the measures to be taken to the detention of 
those who are subject to deportation, but who cannot (for the time being) be removed, is 
not a decision to discriminate against that class on the grounds of nationality’.42  
 
4.3 The Decision of the House of Lords 
 
In A (FC) and others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department43 (hereinafter A 
(Belmarsh Detainees) Case) the appeal was exceptionally heard by a nine-member 
panel.44 The judgment has been described as ‘one of the most constitutionally significant 
ever decided by the House of Lords’.45 All nine made some reference to 9/11. The Senior 
Law Lord, Lord Bingham, delivered the leading judgment.46 A notable feature of his 
opinion was its strong internationalist focus. Along with UK decisions of UK courts and 
the Privy Council, he cited extensively from decisions of the European Commission and 
European Court of Human Rights, and from Canadian and US Supreme Courts. That has 
been a normal feature of post HRA 1998 jurisprudence. Rather more striking is the range 
of other European and international materials cited by Lord Bingham: Opinion 1/2002 of 
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,47 the Siracusa Principles on the 
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,48 the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights,49 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the General Comments of the United 
Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee, the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance, UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolutions of the Security Council of 
the United Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1966, General Recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Law Association’s Paris Minimum 
Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency.50 Dickson has observed that,  
‘For a Law Lord to rely to such an extent ‘soft law’ standards is rare indeed and it will 
certainly add to the status of these standards internationally’.51 
                                                 
42 Id paras 152-3. 
43 [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68. See M Elliott, ‘UK: Detention Without Trial and 
the “War on Terror”’ 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2006) 553-66; R 
O’Keefe, ‘Decisions of British Courts During 2004’ 75 BYIL (2004) 518-35. 
44 This evidences its constitutional importance. 
45 M Loughlin, ‘Introduction to A v Secretary of State for the Home Department’ 68(4) 
MLR (2005) 654.  
46 Lord Nicholls, Lord Scott, Lord Rodger, Lord Carswell and Baroness Hale all made 
approving references to Lord Bingham’s speech. 
47 Council of Europe Doc Comm DH (2002) 7, 28 August 2002, Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles. 
48 7 HRQ (1985) 3. 
49 It is joint in the sense that it is composed of members of the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords. 
50 79 AJIL (1985) 1072, 1074. 
51 B Dickson, ‘Law Versus Terrorism: Can Law Win?’ [2005] EHRLR 11-28 at 23. M 
Arden, ‘Human Rights in The Age of Terrorism’ 121 LQR (2005) 604-27, describes the 
judgment as remarkable for the use it makes of such materials, at 616. There was 
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Lord Bingham began by stressing that, ‘The duty of the House, and the only duty 
of the House in its judicial capacity, is to decide whether the appellants' legal challenge is 
soundly based.’52 His account of the background to the case refers to the events of 9/11 
and the facts that, ‘Before and after 11 September Usama bin Laden, the moving spirit of 
Al-Qaeda, made threats specifically directed against the United Kingdom and its 
people’.53 As noted above, an important aspect of the case was that the problem the UK 
found itself in was because of its efforts to comply with the rulings of the European Court 
of Human Rights and in particular the Chahal case.54 The practical effect of that 
jurisprudence was that, ‘a non-national who faces the prospect of torture or inhuman 
treatment if returned to his own country, and who cannot be deported to any third country 
and is not charged with any crime, may not under article 5(1)(f) of the [ECHR] and 
Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971 be detained here even if judged to be a threat to 
national security’.55 It was this jurisprudence that had necessitated that the UK’s 
derogation to Article 5 to cover the detention powers in Part 4 of ATCSA. 
 
4.4 Proportionality 
 
Lord Bingham accepted the proportionality challenge to the Derogation Order and to s.23 
ATCSA. Central to this view was the argument that the choice of an immigration 
measure to address a security problem had the inevitable result of failing adequately to 
address that problem.56 It allowed non-UK suspected terrorists to leave the country with 
                                                                                                                                                 
similarly extensive use of international materials in Re A Foreign Torture Evidence, 
considered in Part 9 below. 
52 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, Lord Bingham, para 3. 
53 Id, para 6. 
54 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. Essentially the test is whether there 
are substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a 
real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another state. 
55 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, Lord Bingham, para 9. The UK has supported a 
challenge to Chahal in Ramzy v Netherlands, A/25224/05, currently before the European 
Court of Human Rights. The UK submission is reproduced in the JCHR Report, n 373 
below, Ax. 2. It relies on the minority judgment of judges Gölcüklü, Matscher, 
Sir John Freeland, Baka, Mifsud Bonnici, Gotchev And Levits in Chahal that ‘a 
Contracting State which is contemplating the removal of someone from its jurisdiction to 
that of another State may legitimately strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the 
nature of the threat to its national security interests if the person concerned were to 
remain and, on the other, the extent of the potential risk of ill-treatment of that person in 
the State of destination’, para 1. See also the intervention by Justice and Liberty,  
<http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/Ramzy_intervention_Justice.pdf> 
56 Lord Bingham, para 43. See also Lord Hope (serious error to regard the case as about 
the right to control immigration. Rather it was an issue about the aliens’ right to liberty, 
para 103) and (indefinite detention without trial of foreign nationals cannot be said to be 
strictly required to meet the exigencies of the situation, if the indefinite detention without 
trial of those who present a threat to the life of the nation because they are suspected of 
involvement in international terrorism is not thought to be required in the case of British 
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impunity and left British suspected terrorists at large, while imposing the severe penalty 
of indefinite detention on persons who, even if reasonably suspected of having links with 
Al-Qaeda, might harbour no hostile intentions towards the United Kingdom.57 He 
robustly rejected the approach of SIAC and the CA: 
 
    I do not consider SIAC’s conclusion as one to which it could properly come. In  
    dismissing the appellants’ appeal, Lord Woolf CJ broadly considered that it  
    was sensible and appropriate for the Secretary of State to use immigration  
    legislation, that deference was owed to his decisions (para 40) and that  
    SIAC's conclusions depended on the evidence before it (para 43). Brooke LJ  
    reached a similar conclusion (para 91), regarding SIAC's findings as  
    unappealable findings of fact. Chadwick LJ also regarded SIAC's finding as  
    one of fact (para 150). I cannot accept this analysis as correct. The  
    European Court does not approach questions of proportionality as questions  
    of pure fact: see, for example, Smith and Grady v United Kingdom… Nor  
    should domestic courts do so. The greater intensity of review now required  
    in determining questions of proportionality, and the duty of the courts to  
    protect Convention rights, would in my view be emasculated if a judgment at  
    first instance on such a question were conclusively to preclude any further  
    review. So would excessive deference, in a field involving indefinite  
    detention without charge or trial, to ministerial decision. In my opinion,  
    SIAC erred in law and the Court of Appeal erred in failing to correct its  
    error.58 
 
Lord Scott was unable to accept that the Secretary of State had established that section 23 
was ‘strictly required’ by the public emergency. He should, at the least, have shown that   
monitoring arrangements or movement restrictions less severe that incarceration in prison 
would not suffice.59 For Baroness Hale, if it was not necessary to lock up the nationals it 
could not be necessary to lock up the foreigners. It was not strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.60  Finally, a number of the Lordships also made the point that 
it was hard to see that the detainees were so very dangerous given that the Government 
was happy to let them go to any country that would take them.61 This pointed to 
proportionality of the measures.  
 
 
4.5 Discrimination 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationals, para 129) and (s 23 of Act not rationally connected to the legislative objective, 
para 133). 
57 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, para 43. 
58 Id para 44 (emphasis added). 
59 Lord Scott, para 155. 
60 Baroness Hale, para 231. 
61 See Lord Bingham, para 33, Lord Nicholls para 85, Lord Hope, para 133,  Lord Scott, 
para 140, Baroness Hale, para 230 and Lord Carswell, para 240. 
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The appellants also attacked s. 23 as discriminatory on the basis of nationality. The Home 
Secretary had argued that the threat to the life of the nation, ‘came predominantly, but not 
exclusively from foreign nationals and that foreign nationals were using the UK as a base 
for international terrorist activities’.62 Although there was a threat from British nationals, 
extending the ATCSA detention powers to them would be disproportionate:  
 
While it would be possible to seek other powers to detain British citizens who 
may be involved in international terrorism it would be a very grave step. The 
Government believes that such draconian powers would be difficult to justify.63  
 
SIAC had concluded that s 23 was discriminatory because the threat did not stem solely 
from foreign nationals. The CA disagreed but the HL reversed this. The critical issue, as 
often in discrimination analysis, was in determining of the appropriate comparator. The 
Attorney General submitted that the position of the appellants should be compared with 
that of non-UK nationals who represented a threat to the security of the UK but who 
could be removed to their own or to safe third countries. The relevant difference between 
them and the appellants was that the appellants could not be removed. A difference of 
treatment of the two groups was accordingly justified and it was reasonable and 
necessary to detain them. The CA had accepted this on the basis that, ‘the nationals have 
a right of abode in this jurisdiction but the aliens only have a right not to be removed’.64 
However, Lord Bingham rejected this approach because it meant accepting, ‘the 
correctness of the Secretary of State's choice of immigration control as a means to 
address the Al-Qaeda security problem, when the correctness of that choice is the issue to 
be resolved’.65 In his view the proper comparators were suspected international terrorists 
who were UK nationals. The appellants shared with this group the most relevant 
characteristics (a) of being suspected international terrorists and (b) of being 
irremovable.66 Although he accepted that the Attorney General’s comparison might be 
reasonable and justified in an immigration context, it could not be so ‘in a security 
context, since the threat presented by suspected international terrorists did not depend on 
their nationality or immigration status’.67 Baroness Hale also followed this approach. She 
was particularly scathing about the Attorney Generals’ efforts to justify the measures: 
 
No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But substitute ‘black’, 
‘disabled’, ‘female’, ‘gay’, or any other similar adjective for ‘foreign’ before 
‘suspected international terrorist’ and ask whether it would be justifiable to take 
power to lock up that group but not the ‘white’, ‘able-bodied’, ‘male’ or ‘straight’ 
suspected international terrorists. The answer is clear.68 
                                                 
62 Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society 
(February 2004, Cm 6147), para 24. 
63 Id para 36. 
64 A, X and Y (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, CA, per Lord Woolf, para 56. 
65 Id para 53. 
66 Id paras 51-2. Similarly Lord Hope, para 138.  
67 Id para 54. See also Lord Rodger, para 166. 
68 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, Baroness Hale, para 238. 
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The Attorney General also made a more far-reaching submission that, ‘international law 
sanctions the differential treatment, including detention, of aliens in times of war or 
public emergency’.69 After considering a range of European and international materials, 
Lord Bingham asserted that there was no European or other authority for the Attorney 
General’s view. Moreover, there were a number of international treaties and materials 
that were, ‘inimical to the submission that a state may lawfully discriminate against 
foreign nationals by detaining them but not nationals presenting the same threat in a time 
of public emergency.70 A decision to detain one group of suspected international 
terrorists, defined by nationality or immigration status, and not another, could not be 
justified. It was a violation of article 14 ECHR. It was also a violation of article 26 of the 
ICCPR and so inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s ‘other obligations under 
international law’ within the meaning of article 15 ECHR. A range of international 
instruments and US authorities were considered but none were considered to support the 
Attorney General’s view.71 
Lord Nicholls similarly thought that the government had misconceived the human 
rights of non-nationals in this situation.72 For Lord Scott a difference based on the right to 
residence was, ‘irrelevant to the issue as to what measures are required in order to    
combat the threat of terrorism that their presence in this country may be thought by the 
Secretary of State to present’.73 If the measures were really necessary they would 
logically have been applicable to nationals and non-nationals. The measures were as 
irrational as if they had been confined to Muslims only or to men only.74 It was irrational 
and discriminatory to restrict the application of the measures to suspected terrorists who 
had no right of residence in this country. Some suspected terrorists might well be home-
grown.75 Of course, the truth of this last comment became evident in July 2005 when 
there was a series of suicide attacks in London by UK nationals. 
Lord Nicholls stressed that the courts were ‘acutely conscious’ that the 
government alone was able to evaluate and decide what counter-terrorism steps were 
needed and what steps would suffice to protect the security of this country and its 
inhabitants. He accepted that courts were not equipped to make such decisions, and nor 
had they been charged that responsibility. However, Parliament had charged the courts 
with a particular responsibility to check that legislation and ministerial decisions did not 
overlook the human rights of persons adversely affected. The courts would accord to 
Parliament and ministers, the ‘primary decision-makers’, an appropriate degree of 
latitude As the latitude would vary according to the subject matter under consideration, 
the importance of the human right in question, and the extent of the encroachment upon 
                                                 
69 Id Lord Bingham, para 55. 
70 Id para 63. 
71 See also D Wilsher, ‘The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to 
Immigration Control: International and Constitutional Law Perspectives’ 53 ICLQ (2004) 
897-934.  
72 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, HL, para 84. 
73 Lord Scott, para 157. 
74 Lord Scott, para 158. 
75 Id. 
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that right. The courts would only intervene when it was apparent that, in balancing the 
various considerations involved, the primary decision-maker must have given insufficient 
weight to the human rights factor. For Lord Nicholls that was the situation in this case76 
Although this was a national security case where Parliament would normally have 
substantial latitude to make decisions that was undermined because security 
considerations had not prompted a similar negation of the right to personal liberty in the 
case of nationals who posed a similar security risk. The government had described such a 
‘draconian’ power as ‘difficult to justify'.77 But, in practical terms, it was equally 
draconian for a non-national who, in practice, could not leave the country for fear of 
torture abroad.78 
 Lord Hoffman’s opinion attracted the greatest publicity because if its language 
and tenor. It was also firmly grounded in English law and domestic considerations rather 
than in the international and European sources that underlay Lord Bingham’s opinion.79 
Lord Hoffman did not accept the case that there was a threat to the life of the nation for 
the purposes of Article 15 ECHR. Indeed, he was of the view that: 
 
The real threat to the life of the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism 
but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may 
achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a 
victory.80 
 
However, it is worth remembering that Lord Hoffman’s view on the existence of a public 
emergency was not shared by any other member of the House. It has also been criticized 
extra-judicially by Arden LJ on the basis that the Law Lords had not seen the closed 
material in the case.81 It is somewhat ironic is that the leading opinion of Lord Bingham 
and a number of the other opinions actually cited Lord Hoffman’s opinion in Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Rehman82 in support of the argument that that a 
decision on the very existence of an emergency were very much at the political end of the 
spectrum and required legitimation through the democratic process. 
For completeness it is necessary to briefly note Lord Walker’s dissent. He didn’t 
consider the measures to be discriminatory, as there were sound, rational grounds for 
                                                 
76 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, Lord Nicholls, paras 79-81 
77 Citing Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open 
Society (February 2004, Cm 6147), para 36. The discussion paper was a direct response 
of the report of the Newton Committee, n 26 above. 
78 A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case, Lord Nicholls, para 83. 
79 For an excellent analysis see T Poole, ‘Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord 
Hoffmann and the Belmarsh Detainees Case’ 32(4) Journal of Law and Society (2005) 
534-61. 
80 Lord Hoffman, para 97. See also S Jenkins, ‘Judges Cut Through the Hysteria of 
Rulers Made Tyrants By Fear’ The Sunday Times 22 July 2006 (only threat to British 
Constitution came from members of the government). 
81 M Arden, ‘Human Rights In The Age of Terrorism’ 121 LQR (2005) 604-27 at 616. 
82 [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 153, para 62.  
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different treatment, or to be disproportionate, given the safeguards against oppression and 
the possibilities for judicial and parliamentary review.83  
 
4.6 Concluding Comments on the A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case 
 
The House of Lords decision in the A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case was greeted with 
acclaim by human rights lawyers and with shock by the government.84 It is particularly 
significant in terms of how it saw the relative institutional competence of the executive 
and the judiciary. It asserts a relatively strong role for the judiciary in the protection of 
the rule of law in general and of fundamental human rights in particular. The decision can 
be read to support the argument of those who claim that parliamentary sovereignty in the 
UK is gradually being replaced by a system of constitutional supremacy under which 
fundamental rights are not subject to executive or even Parliamentary removal.85  
However, it can be read more narrowly as simply following parliaments own directions in 
the HRA and applying it to the narrow technical legal issue of discrimination – an area 
where courts traditionally feel they have proper expertise.86 Fundamental to the HL’s 
decision was its conception that what was at issue was not an ‘immigration’ matter but a 
‘security’ one. Conceived in security terms, the governments position was illogical and 
irrational because British nationals could present an equal security threat but were not 
subject to detention. In rule of law terms the Act violated the rule that laws should apply 
equally to all save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation.87 In 
emergency situation states have commonly resorted to measures against aliens and 
subsequently sought to extent them to citizens.88 The House of Lords stood up for a small 
number of politically (and largely legally) powerless individuals. As Dickson has rightly 
observed that, ‘The House of Lords, much to its credit, has ensured that the rule of law 
prevails even when very few people, including non-British nationals, have their 
fundamental rights breached’.89 
                                                 
83 See Lord Walker, paras 191-218 
84 See Arden, n 5 above; T Hickman, ‘Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 
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87 See Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ 66 Cambridge Law Journal (2007) 67-85.  
88 See D Cole, Enemy Aliens (New York, New Press, 2003); id, ‘Enemy Aliens’ 54 
Stanford Law Review (2001-02) 953-1004.  
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Legally, under the structure of the HRA, the government did not have to accept 
the declaration of incompatibility.90 However, it was in a difficult legal and political 
position.91 In January 2005 the government announced that it accepted the declaration of 
incompatibility and that new legislation would replace indefinite detention in prison.92 
The new provisions were contained the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 
 
5 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005  
 
After the measures in Part 4 ATCSA were held incompatible with the ECHR in Re A 
(Belmarsh Detainees) the executive proposed a new system of control orders.93 The 
proposals applied to British nationals and non-nationals and were very controversial.94 
The government accepted that they represented a, ‘very substantial increase in the 
executive powers of the State in relation to British citizens’.95 There was a substantial 
rebellion by backbench Labour MP’s in the House of Commons and strong opposition in 
the House of Lords.96 The parliamentary process had to be dealt with very quickly 
because the previous powers to detain the individuals were due to expire on 14 March 
2005. In the event the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA) took just 18 days between 
introduction and Royal Assent. The first control orders, to deal with the ten suspects 
previously interned in Belmarsh, were issued by the Home Secretary immediately.  
The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights produced, at great speed, a 
critical report on the Bill97 The Bill sought to authorise the Secretary of State to make 
‘control orders’ that would allow a suspected terrorist to be placed under house arrest, 
and thereby derogate from the right to liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR, without prior 
judicial authorisation. The Bill would also authorise a wide range of restrictions 
on suspects’ movements, association, expression, and travel, again without prior 
judicial involvement. The JCHR conducted a rigorous rights-review of the proposed 
measures within days of the Bill’s introduction. It questioned why house arrest was being 
contemplated, particularly in light of the Home Secretary’s admission that ‘there is 
currently no need’ to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR. The JCHR also expressed 
doubt about the legitimacy of denying liberty without prior judicial involvement.98 The 
reason given for refusing prior judicial authorisation was that the government had ‘prime 
                                                 
90 See P Naughton, ‘Clarke Stands Firm Over Terror Detainees After Ruling’, The Times, 
December 16, 2004. 
91 D Bonner, ‘Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due 
Process and Human Rights’ 12(1) European Public Law (2006) 45-71 at 59. 
92 See Home Secretary, H.C. Debates, Vol. 430, col. 306-309 (26 January 2005). 
93 The essential idea of these had been proposed by the Newton Committee, n 26 above, 
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94 See Bonner, n 91 above.  
95 H.C. Debates, Vol. 430, col. 309 (26 January 2005). 
96 See M Bright and G Hinslif, ‘Chaos: How War On Terror Became A Political 
Dogfight’ The Observer, 13 March 2005 
97 Ninth Report of JCHR, Session 2004-05, Prevention of Terrorism Bill: Preliminary 
Report, HL 61/ HC 389. 
98 Id, paras 5, 13, 15-17. 
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responsibility to protect the nation’s security’ and that to abdicate this responsibility to 
the judiciary would be inappropriate.99 The JCHR characterised this explanation as an 
‘eccentric interpretation of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers’, and 
reminded the government that the ‘judiciary’s responsibility for the liberty of the 
individual’ had long been accepted and respected. Therefore, to, ‘invoke national security 
to deny that role’ would be to’ subvert’ the nation’s ‘traditional constitutional division of 
powers’.100 This is very strong language and reflects a real difference in the perception of 
executive and judicial roles. 
After strong opposition in the House of Lords in particular, the government 
accepted amendments under which judges authorised control orders (except for 
temporary emergency orders) and that there would be a review of the legislation after a 
year. 
 
5.1 Control Orders 
 
The PTA 2005 provides ‘legislative power to subject to a ‘control order’ any terrorist 
suspect whatever his/her citizenship and whatever the terrorism involved’.101 It was 
designed therefore to avoid dealing with non-nationals differently. The ATCSA 
provisions on detention without trial were repealed with effect from 14 March 2005. Two 
forms of control orders replaced them: ‘non-derogating’ and ‘derogating’. The intended 
distinction was that the conditions in a derogating control order would constitute an 
interference with the right to liberty and security of person in article 5 ECHR and would 
not fall within the exhaustive range of permissible heads of legitimate interference. An 
example would be if the person were effectively under house arrest. A derogating control 
order would require parliamentary approval via an article 15 ECHR designated 
derogation order under the HRA 1998102 and could only be authorised by a judge. 
Derogating control orders can be imposed on application to a judge where there is a 
belief that it is more likely than not that someone is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activities. As of March 2007 no such orders had yet been made, though, as 
explained below, it is arguable that should have been.  
A ‘control order’ is an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him 
for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.103 
The Secretary of State may make a control order against an individual if he: (a) has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activity; and (b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order 
imposing obligations on that individual.104 The obligations that may be imposed by a 
                                                 
99 Charles Clarke, Secretary of State for the Home Department, HC Deb vol 431 col 151-
155 (22 February 2005). 
100 Ninth Report of the JCHR, above n 97 above, para 12. 
101 See D Bonner, ‘Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, 
Due Process and Human Rights’ 12(1) European Public Law (2006) 45-71 at 61. 
102 See s.14(1) Human Rights Act 1998. 
103 S. 1(1) PTA (2005). 
104 S. 2(1) PTA (2005). 
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non-derogating control order are, ‘any obligations that the Secretary of State ... considers 
necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that 
individual in the terrorism-related activity’.105 A non-exhaustive list includes: a 
prohibition or restriction on his possession or use of specified articles or substances; a 
prohibition or restriction on his use of specified services or specified facilities, or on his 
carrying on specified activities; a restriction in respect of his work or other occupation, or 
in respect of his business; a restriction on his association or communications with 
specified persons or with other persons generally; a restriction in respect of his place of 
residence or on the persons to whom he gives access to his place of residence; a 
prohibition on his being at specified places or within a specified area at specified times or 
on specified days; a prohibition or restriction on his movements to, from or within the 
United Kingdom, a specified part of the United Kingdom or a specified place or area 
within the United Kingdom; a requirement on him to comply with such other prohibitions 
or restrictions on his movements as may be imposed, for a period not exceeding 24 hours, 
by directions given to him in the specified manner, by a specified person and for the 
purpose of securing compliance with other obligations imposed by or under the order; a 
requirement on him to surrender his passport, or anything in his possession to which a 
prohibition or restriction imposed by the order relates, to a specified person for a period 
not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force; a requirement on him to 
give access to specified persons to his place of residence or to other premises to which he 
has power to grant access; a requirement on him to allow specified persons to search that 
place or any such premises for the purpose of ascertaining whether obligations imposed 
by or under the order have been, are being or are about to be contravened; a requirement 
on him to allow specified persons, either for that purpose or for the purpose of securing 
that the order is complied with, to remove anything found in that place or on any such 
premises and to subject it to tests or to retain it for a period not exceeding the period for 
which the order remains in force; a requirement on him to allow himself to be 
photographed; a requirement on him to co-operate with specified arrangements for 
enabling his movements, communications or other activities to be monitored by 
electronic or other means; a requirement on him to comply with a demand made in the 
specified manner to provide information to a specified person in accordance with the 
demand; a requirement on him to report to a specified person at specified times and 
places.106 The intention was that each order would be tailored to the particular risk posed 
by the individual concerned. In fact many of the early orders appeared to follow a 
standard format.107 However, gradually there were more variations. Before making, or 
applying for the making of, a control order against the individual, the Secretary of State 
must consult the chief officer of the police force about whether there is evidence 
                                                 
105 S. 1(3) PTA (2005). 
106 S 1(4) PTA (2005). See also ss. 1 (5)-(7). 
107 See T de la Mare, ‘Control Orders and Restrictions on Liberty’ 
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available that could realistically be used for the purposes of a prosecution of the 
individual for an offence relating to terrorism.108 
The PTA 2005 thus permits a range of conditions from house arrest, tagging, 
curfews, controlling access to visitors and restrictions on meetings and communications. 
As of the end of 2005 a total of 18 ‘non-derogating’ control orders had been made. All 
were male men. They are normally protected by an anonymity order.109 One was a UK 
national, all the rest were non-UK nationals. During the period 11 June to 10 September 
2006, nine orders were made with the permission of the court under section 3(l)(a) of the 
2005 Act - one in respect of a British citizen on 19 June 2006, one in respect of a foreign 
national on 31 July 2006, six in respect of foreign nationals on 1 August 2006 and one in 
respect of a British citizen on 5 September 2006. 
The Secretary of State also renewed one control order in accordance with Section 2 (4) 
(b) of the 2005 Act on 30 August 2006. As of 11 September 2006, there are 15 control 
orders currently in force, six of which are in respect of British citizens. During the period 
two requests to modify a control order obligation were agreed, and seven requests to 
modify a control order obligation were refused.110 By the 10 June 2007, 17 control orders 
were in existence, eight of which were in respect of British citizens..111  The first use was 
made using the urgency procedures under section 3(l)(b) of the 2005 Act in February 
2007.112 Four of the seventeen individuals subject to a control order have abscond113ed as 
has another individual in relation to whom a control order was made (i.e. signed) against 
that individual, but before the order had been served. This order was therefore not in 
operation. 
The Minister can impose such an order when he or she has ‘reasonable grounds’ 
to suspect that someone is or has been involved in terrorism-related activities, and 
considers it necessary to do so ‘for purposes connected with protecting members of the 
public from a risk of terrorism’. The imposition must be reviewed by the courts within 
seven days. Individuals subject to these control orders can appeal against them, and the 
conditions in them, on the principles of judicial review. The order will remain in place 
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unless it is ‘obviously flawed’.114 The High Court may consider the case in open or 
closed session. Where national security requires a closed session in the absence of the 
controlee and his chosen legal advisers, a trained and security cleared independent lawyer 
described as a Special Advocate represents the interests of the controlee in the closed 
sessions. Control orders are limited to 12 months’ duration. A fresh application has to be 
made if it is desired that the person concerned should remain a controlee at the end of 
each 12 month period. Breach of any conditions without reasonable excuse is a criminal 
offence punishable on indictment by imprisonment of up to 5 years, or an unlimited 
fine.115 Controlees and the Government both have the option of applying to the court for 
anonymity to apply to the identity of the controlee. For the controlee 
this avoids publicity that might lead to harassment in the community where he/she 
lives, or that might prejudice a fair trial if criminal charges are brought later. Finally, 
s.14(1) of the PTA 2005 requires the Seretary of State for Home Affairs to report to 
Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month 
period on the exercise of the control order powers during that period. 
 
 
5.2 The Distinction Between Derogating and Non-Derogating Control Orders 
 
The distinction between the two forms of control orders is obviously one of degree. Lord 
Carlisle of Berriew QC, the independent reviewer of the legislation, has noted that, ‘The 
intention is that conditions imposed under a control order should be specific and tailored 
to the individual. The aim is to secure the safety of the State by the minimum measures 
needed to ensure effective disruption and prevention of terrorist activity’.116 He also 
observed how restrictive the orders could be: 
 
On any view those obligations [the restrictions imposed under non-derogating 
‘control orders’] are extremely restrictive. They have not been found to amount to 
the triggering of derogation, indeed there has been no challenge so far on that 
basis – but the cusp is narrow…The obligations include an eighteen hour curfew, 
limitation of visitors and meetings to those persons approved by the Home Office, 
submission to searches, no cellular communications or internet, and a 
geographical restriction on travel. They fall not very far short of house arrest, and 
certainly inhibit normal life considerably. 117 
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The JCHR has continued to express strong doubts about the ECHR compatibility of the 
control orders system in the Terrorism Act 2005:  
 
we seriously question renewal without a proper opportunity for a parliamentary 
debate on whether a derogation from Articles 5(1), 5(4) and 6(1) ECHR is 
justifiable, that is, whether the extraordinary measures in the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005, which the Government seeks to continue in force, are 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. It would be premature for us to 
express a view on that question. We merely conclude at this stage that we cannot 
endorse a renewal without a derogation and believe that Parliament should 
therefore be given an opportunity to debate and decide that question.118 
 
The then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, had agreed to table legislation in Spring 2006 
to allow Parliament to consider amendments to the 2005 Act following the first report of 
the Independent Reviewer, Lord Carlile. He reported on 2 February 2006 but the Home 
Secretary announced that he would not be introducing fresh legislation, given that a 
Terrorism Bill was already under consideration. Instead, the government indicated that it 
would allow amendment to the Act in consolidating counter-terrorism legislation 
scheduled for 2007. In any event, sections 1-9 of the 2005 Act were subject to annual 
renewal by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The provisions were 
renewed from 11 March 2006.119 A year later there was still no Terrorism Consolidation 
Bill and the provisions were again renewed until 10 March 2008.120 The JCHR was 
strongly critical of the parliamentary procedure used: 
 
a debate on a motion to approve an affirmative resolution is a wholly 
inappropriate procedure for renewal of provisions of such significance. To fail to 
provide an opportunity to amend the legislation is also, for the second year 
running, a serious breach of commitments made to Parliament. Parliament is 
being deprived once again of an opportunity to debate in detail and amend the 
control orders regime in the light of experience of its operation and concerns 
about its human rights compatibility.121 
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Moreover, Parliament was being asked to be complicit in a de facto derogation from 
Article 5, without an opportunity to debate whether such a derogation was justified.122 
The Government maintains that the affirmative resolution procedure is the appropriate 
mechanism for annual renewal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, providing both 
Houses with the opportunity to debate renewal and the legislation.123 
 
 
5.3 Judicial Control of Control Orders  
 
Non-derogating control orders once made by the Secretary of State under s. 2 and 
derogating control orders once made by the court under s. 4, go their wholly separate and 
very different procedural ways.124 In particular, in the former case the court’s role is 
supervisory and the standard of proof is a reasonable suspicion, whereas in the later case 
the court decides whether to confirm its order on the balance of probabilities. 
Under s 10(2) PTA (2005) where the Secretary of State makes an application for 
permission to make a non-derogating control order against an individual, ‘the application 
must set out the order for which he seeks permission and (a) the function of the court is to 
consider whether the Secretary of State's decision that there are grounds to make that 
order is obviously flawed; (b) the court may give that permission unless it determines that 
the decision is obviously flawed; c) if it gives permission, the court must give directions 
for a hearing in relation to the order as soon as reasonably practicable after it is made’. 
Under s 3(10) on a hearing in pursuance of directions under s 3(2) (c) the function of the 
court is to determine whether any of the following decisions of the Secretary of State was 
flawed (a) his decision that the requirements of section 2(1)(a) and (b) were satisfied for 
the making of the order; and (b) his decisions on the imposition of each of the obligations 
imposed by the order. In determining (a) what constitutes a flawed decision for the 
purposes of subsection (2) ... or (b) the matters mentioned in subsection (10), the court 
must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.125 
The House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee had expressed concern 
that under the PTA (2005) the appeal mechanism used under the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001, has been transposed into potential challenges to control orders: 
 
Under the new provisions, Parliament had accepted that the Home Secretary need 
only demonstrate a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that someone is engaged in prescribed 
activity. The judicial review then only considers whether the Home Secretary’s 
decision was reasonable and does not adequately test whether there was sufficient 
evidence to justify that suspicion. This test is one step further removed from 
whether there was objectively a ‘reasonable suspicion’. The Home Secretary 
merely has to show to a judge that he had ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ not that 
such a belief was reasonable to any objective standard. We believe that this 
                                                 
122 Id paras 17-29.  
123 Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report… [ see n. 00 above] p.4. 
124 See Re MB, Part 00 below. 
125 S 3 (11) PTA (2005). See M Zander, ‘The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005’ 155 
New Law Journal (2005) 438. 
Draft only – not for citation 22 
system could be made fairer through a variation of the current test, whereby the 
Home Secretary would have to prove that the material objectively justified his 
‘reasonable suspicion’.126 
 
The Committee recommended that the Government ‘moves from a judicial review on 
non-derogating control orders to an objective appeal considering whether or not there is a 
‘reasonable suspicion’ that an appellant is involved in terrorist related activities’.127 
In the A (Belmarsh Detainees) Case the House of Lords focused exclusively upon 
the issue of whether or not detention without trial was justified. Little or no attention was 
focused upon the particular means by which an individual’s case was assessed by SIAC 
on appeal, or upon the mechanics and procedures used by SIAC to conduct secret 
hearings. In particular, the House of Lords declined to rule (either way) upon the 
arguments advanced by the appellants based upon the criminal aspects of Article 6 ECHR 
relating to fair trial provisions.128 It was perhaps inevitable that there would be a judicial 
challenge to the orders. 
 
6 Judicial Challenges to Control Orders: Procedures 
 
6.1 The High Court in Re MB 
 
In April 2006, in Re MB,129 the High Court held the first hearing under section 3(10) of 
the PTA (2005) in relation to the non-derogating control order made under section 2(1) of 
the Act. On 1 September, on an application by the home Secretary, the court had made a 
non-derogating control order against MB. The basis for the decision was that the Home 
Secretary of State believed that MB intended to go to Iraq to fight against coalition 
forces. The open statement asserted that MB was an Islamic extremist and that the 
Security Service considered that he was involved in terrorism-related activities The 
control obligations on MB were as follows: 
 
(1) You will reside at [address given] ('the residence') and shall give the Home 
Office at least 7 days prior notice of any change of residence. (2) You shall report 
in person to your local police station (the location of which will be notified in 
writing to you at the imposition of this order) each day at a time to be notified in 
writing by your contact officer, details to be provided in writing upon service of 
the order. (3) You must surrender your passport, identity card or any other travel 
document to a police officer or persons authorised by the Secretary of State within 
24 hours. You shall not apply for or have in your possession any passport, identity 
card, travel document(s) or travel ticket which would enable you to travel outside 
the UK. (4) You must not leave the UK. (5) You are prohibited from entering or 
                                                 
126 Constitutional Affairs Committee, HC, The Operation of the SIAC and the Use of 
Special Advocates, Seventh Report of Session 2004-05, HC 323-1, para105.  
 
127 Id, para 112. 
128 A Case (Belmarsh Detainees), Lord Bingham, para 71. 
129 [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin), [2006] HRLR 29. 
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being present at any of the following:- (a) any airport or sea port; (b) any part of a 
railway station that provides access to an international rail service. (6) You must 
permit entry to police officers and persons authorised by the Secretary of State, on 
production of identification, at any time to verify your presence at the residence 
and/or to ensure that you can comply with and are complying with the obligations 
imposed by the control order. Such monitoring may include but is not limited to:- 
(a) a search of the residence; (b) removal of any item to ensure compliance with 
the remainder of the obligations in these orders; and (c) the taking of your 
photograph.130 
 
There was no argument to the effect that the controls on MB were incompatible with 
Article 5 ECHR. Two special advocates were appointed. They agreed with counsel for 
the Home Secretary that it would not be possible to serve a summary of the closed 
material on the respondent or his legal advisers which would not contain information or 
other material the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest. Sullivan J 
endorsed this view. Therefore, MB had not been provided with even a summary of the 
closed evidence against him.  
The key focus in Re MB was on whether, in discharging its role in hearings under 
section 3(10), the court was able to give MB a fair hearing for the purposes of Article 6 
ECHR. Sullivan J though not. He issued a declaration under s. 4 of the HRA (1998) that 
s. 3 of the PTA (2005) was incompatible with the right to fair hearing under Article 6. He 
identified the six features of the decision-making process: The order was made by the 
executive, not by the court; although the order was made with the permission of the court, 
the ability of the court to exercise a supervisory role at the section 3(2) stage was very 
limited indeed; the standard of proof to be applied by the decision taker in making the 
decision subject to review was very low: reasonable grounds for suspicion, even though 
the allegation made against the respondent, that he is or has been involved in terrorism-
related activity, was a very serious one and may in some cases amount to an allegation 
that he has committed very serious crimes which would be punishable upon conviction in 
a criminal court with life imprisonment; in proceedings under section 3 the Secretary of 
State was able to deploy the whole of his case, relying on evidence which would not be 
admissible in ordinary criminal or civil proceedings, and he may adduce any ‘sensitive’ 
intelligence material in closed documents and closed session. The procedure enabled to 
the Secretary of State to place a significant part, and in some cases the significant part of 
his case, before the court in the absence of the respondent and his legal representatives.131 
The central issue was whether the use of a Special Advocate could sufficiently reduce the 
unfairness of using closed material against a respondent in cases where the court was not 
coming to its own judgment upon the totality of the evidence, open and closed, but was 
merely reviewing the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision based upon the open 
and closed material before the Secretary of State at an earlier stage. Sullivan J concluded 
that, in the absence of a merits review at the section 3(10) stage, the overall procedure 
was ‘manifestly ineffective and unfair’.132 Moreover, ‘nothing short of an ability to re-
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131 See MB, High Court, paras 51-87. 
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examine and reach its own conclusions on the merits of the case (applying the higher 
civil standard of proof …) would be sufficient to give the court ‘full jurisdiction’ for the 
purposes of determining the respondent's rights under Article 8 ECHR in compliance 
with Article 6(1) of the ECHR.133 Sullivan J was particularly damning in his overall 
criticism: 
 
To say that the Act does not give the respondent in this case, against whom a non-
derogating control order has been made by the Secretary of State, a fair hearing in 
the determination of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention would be an 
understatement. The court would be failing in its duty under the 1998 Act, a duty 
imposed upon the court by Parliament, if it did not say, loud and clear, that the 
procedure under the Act whereby the court merely reviews the lawfulness of the 
Secretary of State's decision to make the order upon the basis of the material 
available to him at that earlier stage are conspicuously unfair. The thin veneer of 
legality which is sought to be applied by section 3 of the Act cannot disguise the 
reality. That controlees’ rights under the Convention are being determined not by 
an independent court in compliance with Article 6.1, but by executive decision-
making, untrammelled by any prospect of effective judicial supervision.134 
 
Sullivan J was unable to envisage any circumstances in which it would realistically have 
been possible for the court to conclude that the Secretary of State's decisions were legally 
flawed upon the basis of the one-sided information then available to him. It followed that 
the control order was to continue in force. However, he made a declaration under s.4 
HRA that that the procedures under s. 3 of the PTA (2005) relating to the supervision of 
the court of non-derogating control orders made by the Secretary of State were 
incompatible with the respondent’s right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR.135 
 
 
6.2 The Court of Appeal in Re MB 
 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB136 the Court of Appeal ‘unravelled’ 
each strand of Sullivan J’s reasoning.137 Interestingly, before the Court of Appeal the 
executive was in an interesting position of having to argue that the High Court’s powers 
of review of the Secretary of State’s decision were more extensive than Sullivan J had 
considered them to be. He argued, first, that given the appropriate purposive construction, 
section 3(10) PTA (2005) required the court to review the Secretary of State’s decision 
having regard to the evidence before the court at the time of conducting the review and 
not solely at the time of the original decision. Secondly, s 1(2) PTA (2005) required the 
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Queen’s Bench Division. 
137 Id para 87. 
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court to consider whether, as at the time of the review, there was any interference with 
the suspect's human rights.138 The CA agreed with these submissions. It considered that, 
in accordance with s 3 HRA, s. 3(1) PTA (2005), ‘can and should be “read down” so as 
to require the court to consider whether the decisions of the Secretary of State in relation 
to the control order are flawed as at the time of the court's determination’.139  
As for the standard of review, the CA did not consider that the terms of s. 3(10), 
when read in the light of s. 1(2), restricted the court to a standard of review that fell short 
of that required to satisfy Article 6. Proceedings under s 3 PTA (2005) did not involve the 
determination of a criminal charge. The CA took a sophisticated approach to the courts’ 
powers of review by focusing on the distinction, ‘between a finding of fact and a decision 
which turns on a question of policy or expediency. So far as the former is concerned, 
Article 6 may require the factual evaluation to be carried out by a judicial officer. So far 
as the latter is concerned, the role of the court may be no more than reviewing the 
fairness and legality of the administrator to whom Parliament has entrusted the policy 
decision’.140 The first requirement in s 2 PTA was that the Secretary of State must have 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the controlled person is or has been involved in 
terrorist-related activity. For the CA this element involved an assessment of fact. As 
involvement in terrorist-related activity was likely to constitute a serious criminal 
offence, this suggested that when reviewing a decision by the Secretary of State to make 
a control order, the court must make up its own mind as to whether there were reasonable 
grounds for the necessary suspicion.141 Whether there were reasonable grounds for 
suspicion was an objective question of fact. A court could not review the decision of the 
Secretary of State without itself deciding whether the facts relied upon by the Secretary 
of State amounted to reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subject of the control 
order, ‘is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity’.142 
 The second requirement for a control order was that the Secretary of State must 
consider that it was necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the 
public from a risk of terrorism, to make the order. For the CA this second element 
required a value judgment as to what was necessary by way of protection of the public.  
In reviewing this second element different considerations applied: 
 
Whether it is necessary to impose any particular obligation on an individual  
in order to protect the public from the risk of terrorism involves the  
customary test of proportionality. The object of the obligations is to control  
the activities of the individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take  
part in any terrorism-related activity. The obligations that it is necessary  
to impose may depend upon the nature of the involvement in terrorism-related  
activities of which he is suspected. They may also depend upon the resources  
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available to the Secretary of State and the demands on those resources. They  
may depend on arrangements that are in place, or that can be put in place, for  
surveillance.  
The Secretary of State is better placed than the court to decide the 
measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a terrorist 
suspect and, for this reason, a degree of deference must be paid to the decisions 
taken by the Secretary of State. That it is appropriate to accord such deference in 
matters relating to state security has long been recognised, both by the courts of 
this country and by the Strasbourg court, see for instance: Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v Rehman [2001]UKHL 47; [2003] AC 153; The Republic 
of Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25.  
   Notwithstanding such deference there will be scope for the court to give  
 intense scrutiny to the necessity for each of the obligations imposed on an  
 individual under a control order, and it must do so. The exercise has  
 something in common with the familiar one of fixing conditions of bail. Some  
 obligations may be particularly onerous or intrusive and, in such cases, the  
 court should explore alternative means of achieving the same result. The  
 provision of section 7(2) for modification of a control order ‘with the  
 consent of the controlled person’ envisages dialogue between those acting for  
 the Secretary of State and the controlled person, and this is likely to be  
 appropriate, with the assistance of the court, at the stage that the court is  
 considering the necessity for the individual obligations.143 
 
As for the low standard of proof for the requirement that find that the controlled person 
was or had been involved in terrorism-related activities, the CA considered that Sullivan J 
had confused substance, relevant to the substantive Articles of the Convention, and 
procedure, relevant to Article 6: 
 
The PTA authorises the imposition of obligations where there are  
reasonable grounds for suspicion. The issue that has to be scrutinised by the  
court is whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. That exercise may  
involve considering a matrix of alleged facts, some of which are clear beyond  
reasonable doubt, some of which can be established on balance of probability  
and some of which are based on no more than circumstances giving rise to  
suspicion. The court has to consider whether this matrix amounts to reasonable  
grounds for suspicion and this exercise differs from that of deciding whether  
a fact has been established according to a specified standard of proof. It is  
the procedure for determining whether reasonable grounds for suspicion exist  
that has to be fair if Article 6 is to be satisfied.144  
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Draft only – not for citation 27 
The aspect of the case that caused the CA most concern was the use of closed material 
but it accepted that both Strasbourg (i.e. ECHR) and domestic authorities had accepted 
that there were circumstances where the use of closed material was permissible and might 
not be incompatible with Articles 5(4), 6 and 13 ECHR.145 For the CA the issue was 
whether Article 6 required an absolute standard of fairness to be applied, or whether, in a 
case such as that before it, present, some derogation from that standard was permissible 
in the interests of national security. It considered that the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
accepted the latter approach. In particular: 
 
If one starts with the premise that the risk of terrorism may justify [powers 
conferred on the executive to interfere with individual rights in order to protect 
the public against the risk of terrorism] such measures, we consider that it must 
follow that Article 6 cannot automatically require disclosure of the evidence of 
the grounds for suspicion. Were this not so, the Secretary of State would be in the 
invidious position of choosing between disclosing information which would be 
damaging to security operations against terrorists, or refraining from imposing 
restrictions on a terrorist suspect which appear necessary in order to protect 
members of the public from the risk of terrorism.  
If one accepts, as we do, that reliance on closed material is permissible,  
this can only be on terms that appropriate safeguards against the prejudice  
that this may cause to the controlled person are in place. We consider that  
the provisions of the PTA for the use of a special advocate, and of the rules  
of court made pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Schedule to the PTA, constitute  
appropriate safeguards, and no suggestion has been made to the contrary.146  
 
In conclusion the Court of Appeal found the provisions for review by the court of the 
making of a non-derogating control order complied with the requirements of  
Article 6. The MB case has been appealed to the House of Lords.147 
 
7 Judicial Challenges to Control Orders: Substance - The Right to Liberty 
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7.1 The High Court in JJ and others 
 
In June 2006, in Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and others148 Sullivan J 
also heard an application from six individuals subject to control orders. The obligations 
on them were far more restrictive than those imposed on MB. They related to: Electronic 
tagging (to be worn at all times); Residence (being required for 18 hours per day, and for 
five of the controlees, in areas with which they had no previous connection); Reporting to 
a monitoring company; Visitors to the residence; Pre-arranged meeting outside the 
residence; Identified individuals with whom any association or communication 
Prohibited; Police searches (in each case there had been a number of searches); Further 
prohibitions or restrictions; Communications equipment (only one fixed telephone line 
permitted); Mosque attendance; Restriction to geographical area; Notification of 
international departure and arrival Bank account; Transfer of money/ sending of 
documents or goods; Passport/ identity card etc; Prohibition from entering air or sea port 
etc.149 In  JJ and others the only issue considered was whether the cumulative impact of 
the obligations imposed by the orders amounted to a deprivation of the respondents’ 
liberty in breach of Article 5(1) ECHR? If so, the Secretary of State had made a 
derogating control order which he had no power to do (and which the court had no power 
to do in the absence of a designated derogation). Sullivan J emphacised that the 
restrictions had not been imposed to protect the interests of the individuals. Rather, they 
had been imposed to protect the public. In the absence of a derogation under Article 15 
ECHR the respondents were entitled to the full protection of Article 5, and there was no 
justification for any attempt to water down that protection in response to the threat of 
terrorism. He considered that the respondents’ liberty to lead a normal life in their 
residences during the 18-hour curfew period was so curtailed as to be non-existent for all 
practical purposes. He also observed that the restrictions on social contacts significantly 
affected their liberty to lead a normal life. Overall he concluded that: 
 
bearing in mind the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the 
obligations in these control orders, I am left in no doubt whatsoever that the 
cumulative effect of the obligations has been to deprive the respondents of their 
liberty in breach of Article 5 of the Convention. I do not consider that this is a 
borderline case. The collective impact of the obligations in Annex I could not 
sensibly be described as a mere restriction upon the respondents' liberty of 
movement. In terms of the length of the curfew period (18 hours), the extent of 
the obligations, and their intrusive impact on the respondents' ability to lead  
anything resembling a normal life, whether inside their residences within the  
curfew period, or for the 6-hour period outside it, these control orders go  
far beyond the restrictions in those cases where the European Court of Human  
Rights has concluded that there has been a restriction upon but not a  
deprivation of liberty.  
The respondents’ “concrete situation” is the antithesis of liberty, and is  
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more akin to detention in an open prison…  the respondents’ lives are not free, but 
are for all practical purposes under the control of the Home Office.150 
 
Sullivan J then considered whether he should defer to the Home Secretary’s opinion that 
the control orders were not incompatible with Article 5 ECHR. He saw no reason for 
such deference: 
 
While the court will defer, to the extent that it is appropriate, to the  
Secretary of State's views on certain matters, including, for example, what  
obligations are necessary under subsection 1(3) of the Act, there is no reason  
for such deference in respect of the Secretary of State's view that the  
obligations in these control orders merely restrict the respondents’ liberty,  
but do not deprive the respondents of their liberty: see paragraph 221 of the  
speech of Baroness Hale in [A Case (Belmarsh Detainees)]. The Secretary of 
State's view on that question is only as good as the analysis of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence that was carried out on his behalf before he made the orders. 
Naturally, I have not seen that analysis, but insofar as it is reflected in the 
submissions made on behalf of the Secretary of State in these proceedings, I have 
explained why I have found them unpersuasive. In saying that I intend no 
disrespect to Mr Eicke, whose ability to construct a silk purse out of a sow's ear 
was, as always, most impressive.151 
 
Sullivan J noted that his view accorded with that of the JCHR, cited above152 and with the 
concerns of Mr Alvaro Gil-Robles, the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human 
Rights, in his report to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly on 
his visit to the United Kingdom on 4th-12th November 2004.153 As to the appropriate 
remedy the Home Secretary argued that the court should direct the Home Secretary to 
revoke or modify the orders rather than quash them. Sullivan J expressed concern at this 
view because the UK had previously given an assurance to the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe that the court could quash such an order. Sullivan J regarded this 
change of position as having the:   
 
the potential to undermine confidence in the integrity of public administration. 
The United Kingdom government's comments in 2005 would have left the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with the reassuring impression 
that if a control order made by the Secretary of State did constitute a deprivation 
of liberty, then the court could be expected to use its powers to quash that order, 
but now that the crunch has come in 2006, the Secretary of State is strenuously 
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seeking to persuade the court that it would not be appropriate to exercise that 
power. One would have thought that public assurances given by the UK 
government in response to concerns expressed in an official report could be relied 
upon, particularly where a Convention right of ‘fundamental importance’ was in 
issue.154 
 
Sullivan J considered that the proper course was to quash the control orders. 
Unsurprisingly, the decisions of Sullivan J on control orders attracted wide publicity.155 
They were attacked by the new Home Secretary, John Reid, and appealed.156  
 
7.2 The Court of Appeal in JJ and others 
 
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ and Others,157 decided on the same 
day, and with the same composition as the appeal in Re MB, the Court of Appeal upheld 
the decision of Sullivan J that the control orders amounted to a deprivation of liberty 
contrary to Article 5 ECHR. In the Court of Appeal’s view they, ‘clearly fell on the 
wrong side of the dividing line’.158 The Court also held that Sullivan J was correct to 
conclude that he had jurisdiction to quash the orders and that the reasons he gave for 
quashing them were compelling. It gave an additional reason, namely that if the Secretary 
of state decided to make new control orders to replace those that had been quashed, he 
would have to devise a new package of measures imposing control on the respondents. In 
the courts’ view that was an exercise that the Secretary of State was, ‘very much better 
placed to perform than the courts’.159 The response of the Secretary of State was that he 
would appeal the matter to the House of Lords. In the meantime some of the conditions 
have been relaxed e.g. in one case by reducing the curfew from 18 hours to 14. There was 
further political controversy over control orders in October 2006 when it emerged that 
two people subject to orders had escaped and were missing.160 They had been missing for 
a month but the government had not informed the public. 
 
7.3 The High Court in the E Case 
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The third major judicial challenge to control orders came in E v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.161 This was the first full hearing with evidence about the relevant 
factual issues. In the E case the High Court considered whether a less restrictive control 
order amounted to a deprivation of liberty. The subject of the control order was a 
Tunisian national who had been in the UK since 1994. He had been convicted in his 
absence by a Tunisian military court for various terrorism offences under Tunisian law. 
His claim for asylum in the UK had been refused but he had been granted exceptional 
leave to remain in the UK until 2005. He was married with four young children under the 
age of 7, and, at the time of High Court hearing, E’s wife (S) was five months pregnant.  
E lived in his own home. It is helpful to set out the terms of the control order and the 
justification for it. E was required to reside in his home and remain there, save between 
7am and 7pm, or as specified in written directions.  By a variation, the residence included 
the garden.  He was required to report to a monitoring company by telephone each day on 
the first occasion he left the residence and on the last occasion he returned to it.  Except 
by prior agreement with the Home Office, he could not permit any person to enter the 
residence, apart from his wife and children, his nominated legal representative, members 
of the emergency services or health care or social work professionals, any person aged 10 
or under and any person required to be given access under the tenancy agreement.  When 
seeking agreement for the entry of other persons, E was required to supply the name, 
address, date of birth and photographic identity of the individual to be admitted.  The 
prior agreement of the Home Office was not required for subsequent visits by an agreed 
individual unless the existing agreement was withdrawn. E could not, outside the 
residence, meet any person by prior arrangement other than his wife and children, his 
legal representative, for health and welfare purposes at establishments to be agreed by the 
Home Office, or for educational purposes at establishments similarly agreed.  He could 
not attend any pre-arranged meetings or gatherings, other than attending group prayers at 
a mosque, save, in all the above cases, with the prior agreement of the Home Office. E 
had to permit entry to his residence to police officers and persons authorised by the 
Secretary of State or by the monitoring company, on production of identification, to 
verify his presence at the residence and to ensure that he could comply and was 
complying with the obligations imposed by the order.  Monitoring could include searches 
of the residence, inspection and removal of articles to ensure that they do not breach 
obligations imposed by the order, and the installation of equipment considered necessary 
to ensure compliance with the obligations.  E could not bring or permit into the residence, 
or use, whether in or outside the residence, any communications equipment (including 
mobile phones) other than one fixed telephone line in the residence and one or more 
computers.  The computer had to be disabled from connecting to the internet.  Other 
persons entering the residence could bring in a mobile phone, provided it was switched 
off while E was in the residence.  E had to notify the Home Office of any intended 
departure from the United Kingdom and report to the Home Office immediately upon 
arrival on return.  He could not hold more than one bank account.  He could not transfer 
any money, or send any documents or goods, to a destination outside the United 
Kingdom, without the prior agreement of the Home Office.   
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The justification for the order was set out by the Secretary of State in an open 
statement made in March 2005: 
 
E was detained under the ATCSA in December 2001 on the 
basis of his current involvement with, and activities in 
support of, terrorist groups and networks which pose a 
direct threat to the national security of the UK.  The 
Secretary of State assesses that unless stringent bail 
conditions are imposed upon him, E would resume his 
extremist activities in connection with these groups and 
networks, and would continue to pose a threat to the UK’s 
national security.   
The justification for restrictions relating to meetings, contacts and visitors was stated to 
be that much of E’s terrorism-related activity necessarily involved regular contact with 
associates who were themselves involved in the same or other terrorism-related activity.  
Restrictions on E’s capacity to contact such persons or to share his expertise and contacts 
reduced the risk that he would involve himself again in those activities.  
The High Court concluded that, although this was  more finely balanced than the 
JJ cases, the cumulative effect of the restrictions deprived E of his liberty in breach of 
Article 5 ECHR. It was the subjection to police and other searches of E’s home and the 
requirement that all visitors (and pre-arranged meetings outside the house) be approved in 
advance which made the requirements particularly intense.  The restrictions that applied 
within the house give E’s home some of the, ‘characteristics of prison accommodation in 
which the prisoner has no private space and his visitors are all vetted’.162  
7.4 The Court of Appeal in the E Case 
The CA reversed the decision.163 By reference to the ECHR jurisprudence in Engel & 
Ors v Netherlands (No.1),164 Guzzardi v Italy,165 Ciancimino v Italy,166 and Trijonis v 
Lithuania167 it set out the principles by which it approached the issue. The starting point 
was to consider the ‘physical liberty’ of the person, individual liberty in the classic sense.  
Article 5(1) was not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement which are 
governed by article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and which had not been ratified by the United 
Kingdom.  The effect of the physical restraint had to be considered in the context of 
restrictions applied when the restraint was not operating.  Whether the confinement was 
in the individual’s own home could be very relevant but the inviolability or otherwise of 
the home was a relevant consideration. The opportunity for social contacts was also a 
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factor.  The difference between deprivation of liberty, contrary to article 5(1), and 
restriction upon liberty was one of degree or intensity. The court was concerned with the 
‘effect’, ‘duration’ and ‘manner of implementation’ of the restrictions, as well as the 
‘type’ of restriction.168  The state of a controlled person’s health, whether the disability 
was physical or mental, and possibly other ‘person specific’ characteristics, might have 
an impact upon the severity of the effect, in his case, of restrictions imposed.  In this case, 
only very limited weight could be given to this factor.169 With respect to some of the 
restrictions imposed by this and other orders, and said to contribute to the breach of 
article 5, their duration, and their intensity, may be relevant to whether the overall 
restrictions amount to a deprivation of liberty.170 The restrictions were to be considered 
on the basis that they were likely to be renewed.171 That restrictions engaged other 
articles in the Convention, such as article 8, did not mean that they should be disregarded 
in an article 5 context, but it had to be kept in mind that it was deprivation of liberty, and 
not some other right, which was under consideration.             
Applying these principles to the facts the CA stressed that E was free to practise a 
range of activities, during the day time, in an area with which he was very familiar, and 
beyond it.  He could attend the mosque and educational courses where he was likely to 
meet a range of persons and to do so regularly. The facts were very different from the 
cases in JJ in that (a) a period of curfew in the present case was substantially shorter, 12 
hours out of 24 as against 18; (b) E was living with his family in his own home, with 
garden, whereas the specified residences in the JJ cases were one bedroom flats away 
from areas in which the controlled persons had previously lived; (c) the controlled 
persons in the JJ cases were confined to restricted urban areas which, save in one case, 
did not extend to any area in where they had previously lived.  The physical liberty of E, 
that is individual liberty in its classic sense, was both the starting point and the central 
issue. E was deprived of the right to leave his home, and was detained in it, for 12 hours a 
day, the overnight hours. It was, however, his own home (and garden) and he could live 
there with his wife and young family.  During the remaining 12 hours, the daytime hours, 
not only was there no geographical restriction on where he might go but his starting 
point, his home, was in the area he knew well as a result of having lived there for four 
years. That degree of physical restraint upon liberty was, ‘far from a deprivation of 
liberty in article 5 terms’.172   
The intrusion into E’s life at home and the restriction on his outside activities also 
had to be considered.  Combined with a degree of physical restraint, such restrictions 
might create a breach of article 5 but it had to be kept in mind that it was the concept of 
individual liberty in its classic sense which was in issue, a different concept from, for 
example, respect for private and family life. Intrusions into home and family life might 
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contribute to a loss of liberty but their impact and effect on liberty required analysis.  
While the intrusion, under the control order, was potentially substantial, and applied 
throughout the 24 hours, the CA did do not consider that it led to a finding that the home 
thereby acquired the characteristics of ‘prison accommodation’ in which E is detained, as 
had been suggested in the High Court.173  It retained the attributes of a family home 
where domestic life could be enjoyed at all times.174  As to the alleged ‘chilling effect’ of 
the restrictions on people visiting the premises, it was the control order itself which 
essentially created the chill.   In AF (considered below), there was evidence to that effect 
and Ouseley J so found but for the CA an inference could readily be drawn that people 
would be less ready to visit the home of someone subject to a control order, the existence 
of which was likely to be known.  The requirement to ‘register’ visitors might add to the 
reluctance to visit but was unlikely to be the sole or main cause, and the restriction should 
be viewed in that light.  The restrictions on E’s outside activities and contents were also 
significant and their effect on E had to be considered.  Keeping in mind that protection of 
physical liberty was at the heart of any consideration of article 5, they did not make a 
substantial or decisive contribution to a complaint of deprivation of liberty. Restrictions 
were placed upon E’s activities in that in that he could not, without the appellant’s 
agreement, make prior arrangements to meet people or attend pre-arranged meetings or 
gatherings.  He was, however, left with wide opportunities, and in fact did engage in 
everyday activities, including religious observance and practices.  He could take up 
educational opportunities at agreed establishments.  Not only could he engage in these 
activities, but they provided considerable opportunity to make a wide range of social 
contacts in an area with which he was very familiar, and beyond.  Finally, the court also 
had to have regard to the ‘manner’ in which restrictions were implemented.  Save that 
there were teething troubles, there was no evidence that the restrictions were being 
implemented, or the powers granted exercised, in an oppressive manner, or a manner 
beyond that contemplated by the stated justification for them, or as significantly 
interfering with domestic life or outside activities.  The CA’s conclusion was that, 
‘Bearing in mind the ‘type, duration, effects and manner of implementation’ of the order, 
no deprivation of liberty, within the meaning of article 5 was established.  E’s case was in 
material respects plainly distinguishable from the JJ cases.  The facts of E’s case fell on 
the right side of the dividing line.175     
 
7.5 The High Court in the AF Case 
 
Before the CA decision on E, another breach of Article 5 was found in Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v AF.176 The facts were different from those in other cases 
considered.  Ouseley J cited the CA’s decision in JJ and the High Court judgment in the 
E case.  He recognised the ‘quite intrusive process’ involved in a restriction on receiving 
guests without prior approval.  He accepted the ‘chilling effect’ of the control order upon 
the controlled person meeting with other people, in the home and outside.  The curfew 
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was of fourteen hours duration.  AF was able to meet almost whom he liked either in his 
home or outside it provided he remained in the permitted area.  The real restriction 
outside curfew hours, the judge held, was in the extent of the permitted area.  The area 
from which the controlled person was excluded included all three mosques to which he 
used to go, and prevented him from going into any significant educational establishment 
where he could study English.  Ouseley J concluded that taken by themselves, any one of 
the restrictions which flowed from the way in which the area has been delineated would 
not amount to a deprivation of liberty.  He was not prevented from re-arranging many 
parts of his life within his area.  But together they cut him off to a large extent from his 
previous life.  He attributed particular significance to the cumulative restrictions on 
mosques and educational establishments or employment opportunities in judging whether 
there is a deprivation of his liberty.  They had to be seen as additional to those which 
applied during curfew hours.177 The judge concluded that, although as with E the decision 
was quite finely balanced, the restrictions cumulatively amount to a deprivation of 
liberty.  They were markedly less severe than those in JJ and Others but broadly they 
were of comparable severity to those in E, overall.  In E the requirement for prior 
approval for all visitors to the home and for prior approval for any pre-arranged meetings, 
and the requirement for approval to attend any meetings were very real restrictions which 
tipped the balance towards there being a deprivation of liberty.  Those serious features 
were not present in that way in AF. Outside, curfew hours AF could have visitors to his 
flat and he could meet them outside both without prior approval.  But instead AF had a 
longer curfew, and a geographical area which had specific effects in relation to 
attendance at his preferred mosque and the pursuit of education in English, as well as 
other specific and more general impacts on what AF used to do.  There was no issue over 
the mosque in E and E had a larger family group, including his children, with whom he 
had unrestricted contact. Ouseley J permitted AF to adopt a ‘leapfrog’ procedure and 
petition the House of Lords for leave to appeal.  
 
 
8 Judicial Challenges to Control Orders: The Possibility of Prosecution 
 
In E v Secretary of State for the Home Department178 even if the High Court had not 
found there to be a deprivation of liberty and a breach of Article 5 ECHR, it would have 
quashed the control order in question because of a failure by the Government to keep the 
possibility of prosecution under review after the control order was made. Under s.8 PTA 
2005 the Home Secretary is under a continuing duty to keep the decision to impose and 
maintain a control order under review and the High Court held that this included keeping 
the matter of prosecution under review. On the facts in the E case, the Court found that 
significant new material had become available since the making of the control order, in 
the form of two Belgian court judgments in cases in which associates of E were 
successfully prosecuted for terrorism offences, and in which there were references to 
their association with E and to his activities. In those Belgian proceedings, intercept 
evidence from Spain and the Netherlands had been admitted, and that evidence would in 
                                                 
177 Id pr 88. 
178 See n 239 above. 
Draft only – not for citation 36 
principle be admissible in England because it originated from abroad.179 The High Court 
found that the possibility of prosecuting E in the light of the material about him identified 
in the Belgian judgments needed to be considered by the Home Secretary. The High 
Court therefore found as a fact that at no point was the question of prosecution reviewed 
in the light of the Belgian judgments. This failure to consider the impact of significant 
new material on the prospects of prosecuting E meant that the Home Secretary’s 
continuing decision to maintain E’s control order was flawed, and would have been 
quashed on this basis.  
The Court of Appeal agreed in part but saw the matter differently. When properly 
considered in its statutory context the duty under section 8(2) was not a condition 
precedent.  Once it was accepted that there was a continuing duty to review pursuant to 
MB, it was implicit in that duty that the Secretary of State must do what he reasonably 
could to ensure that the continuing review was meaningful.  There could be no properly 
considered answer to the question about the prospect of prosecution unless and until the 
police were provided with the Belgian judgments.  That had not occurred by February 
and March 2006.  There had been a breach by the Secretary of State of his MB duty to 
keep the question of possible prosecution under review, not in the sense that the decision 
to prosecute was one for him (for clearly it was not), but in the sense that it was 
incumbent upon him to provide the police with material in his possession which was or 
might be relevant to any reconsideration of prosecution.  The duty extended to a duty to 
take reasonable steps to ensure that the prosecuting authorities are keeping the prospects 
of prosecution under review.  The duty did not, however, extend to the Secretary of State 
becoming the prosecuting authority.  The decision whether to prosecute lay elsewhere.180 
The breach arose from the omission of the Secretary of State himself to provide the 
police with the Belgian judgments so as to prompt and facilitate a reconsideration.  That 
failure rendered nugatory the negative responses of the police at meetings of the Control 
Orders Review Group (CORG) when asked about prosecution.181 
However, the CA differed on the appropriate relief. It did not regard the breach as 
‘technical’.  Beatson J had concluded that the identified breach led inexorably to a 
finding of a flawed decision and to the quashing of the order. He had stated the question 
as being ‘whether there is now evidence which gives rise to a realistic possibility of 
prosecuting E’. The CA considered this to be an error as the findings of the Belgian 
courts were not in themselves evidence capable of supporting a successful prosecution in 
this country.  When properly considered, they may or may not enable investigators and 
prosecutors to assemble a case with a realistic prospect of success.  However, even if the 
Secretary of State had acted diligently and expeditiously in relation to the Belgian 
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judgments, we are satisfied that, again taken at their highest, they could not have given 
rise to a prosecution at any time material to the case.  A prosecution in this jurisdiction 
had to conform with domestic procedural and evidential requirements.  The Belgian 
judgments were not in themselves capable of being evidence in an English trial.  At best, 
they were in a form which might ultimately enable investigators and prosecutors to 
adduce evidence from relevant and appropriate witnesses.  The CA had seen no material 
to suggest that the material could realistically have been reduced to a form appropriate for 
prosecution within the relevant timescale.  Not every breach of an obligation rendered a 
subsequent decision flawed.  The CA considered that the refusal of Ouseley J to quash a 
control order by reference to one of the breaches he found in AF was undoubtedly 
correct. It supported his view that not every breach necessarily made a control order a 
nullity and required it to be quashed.  For the CA the critical question was whether a 
particular breach materially contributed to and vitiated the decision to make the control 
order.  In the E case the breach delayed the process of review by the police and the CPS 
but that, absent the breach, no different decision about the maintenance and renewal of 
the control order would have been taken or required at any material time.  It was an error 
of law to hold that the breach justified the remedy.  We consider that it was wrong to 
describe the Belgian judgments as ‘evidence’ giving rise to a realistic possibility of 
prosecution.  Further analysis of the consequences of the breach was required. More 
generally, the question, on an appeal under section 10(4), was to decide whether the 
decision of the appellant was flawed.  In deciding that, the duty to be considered was the 
duty to keep the prosecuting authorities informed and to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that they are keeping the controlled person’s conduct, with a view to his prosecution for 
an offence, under review.  The duty was not to assume the role of prosecuting authority 
or to assume responsibility for every decision taken by that authority.182  The JCHR 
considered that the High Court decision in the E case and the second report of the 
independent reviewer cast serious doubt on the seriousness of the Government’s 
commitment to prosecution as its first preference. Its evidence supported fears that once a 
control order is imposed it relieved the pressure on the police and the Home Office to 
bring a criminal prosecution.183 It remains the JCHR’s view that the only human rights 
compatible answer is to find ways of prosecuting such individuals.184 
Finally, ihe CA dismissed three other sets of arguments: arguments (1) the lack of 
sufficient scrutiny by the judge of the individual obligations imposed on the respondent; 
(2) the lack of procedural fairness in the making and / or the renewing of the control 
order; and (3)   - on behalf of S and the children – the alleged breaches of Convention 
articles 3 and 8 so far as E’s family was concerned.185 
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9 The Future for Control Orders 
 
E’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment was heard together with the other 
control order cases in July 2007. The Secretary of State’s appeal in relation to the AF 
judgment has leapfrogged the Court of Appeal, and was heard together with the JJ and 
others and MB cases in the House of Lords. The government remain of the view that the 
control order regime, as it is currently being implemented, does not breach Article 5 
ECHR.186 It does not accept that any of the control orders made thus far are derogating 
control orders or deprive any individual of their liberty. Consequently it does not believe 
either that a derogation is necessary or that Parliament is being asked to be complicit in a 
de facto derogation.187 These are civil procedures with civil procedure rules. The 
Government does not accept that control order proceedings amount to a criminal 
charge.188 
 
Lord Carlile, the statutory reviewer of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 
concluded that the control order system remained necessary, though in some cases the 
obligations imposed were more cautious and extensive than absolutely necessary.189 The 
JCHR has argued that the combination of the degree of restriction imposed by control 
orders, their indefinite duration, and the limited opportunity to challenge the basis on 
which they are made, carries a very high risk of subjecting those who are placed under 
control orders to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.190  
The Government accepts that control orders are less than 100% effective in countering 
terrorism. There are limitations and problems with the legal framework.  The 
Government must operate under the constraints imposed by Parliament, the courts and 
the law. The Governments view is that, in policy terms, ‘Control orders are not even our 
second - or third - best option for dealing with suspected terrorists. But under our existing 
laws they are as far as we can go’.191 It considers that control orders are the best available 
means of addressing the continuing threat posed by suspected terrorists who cannot 
currently be prosecuted or, in respect of foreign nationals, cannot be removed from the 
UK.192 The Independent Reviewer, Lord Carlile, expressed a similar view in his second 
report in 2007: 
 
I would prefer it if no control order system was necessary. However, in my view 
it remains necessary given the nature of the risk of terrorist attacks and the 
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difficulty of dealing with a small number of cases. Control orders provide a 
proportional means of dealing with those cases, if administered correctly.193 
.  
The Security Service view is that control orders have been successful in preventing or 
limiting individuals’ involvement in terrorism-related activity.194 The independent 
reviewer and the JCHR have referred to the need for an ‘exit strategy’ from the control 
order regime. 
 
 
11 Policy Options 
 
 
Finally, it remains to note that the control order regime may be impacted by 
developments in other anti-terrorist strategies. In 2007 the Government announced  
proposals for new counter-terrorism legislation.195 
 
11.1 More Prosecutions. 
 
This is the governments preferred strategy. More lower level terrorist related offences 
have been created196 and prosecuted.197 The strategy is supported by the JCHR and some 
human rights organizations e.g. Liberty.  
 
11.2 Use of Intercepted Intelligence in Courts 
 
To obtain more convictions one strategy would be use intercepted intelligence 
information in courts, particularly information derived from the tapping of phones.  and 
telephone tapping. To date the government has not been convinced. Under current 
legislation Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, there is a statutory ban 
on the use of intercept as evidence.198 The Government’s position has been that we would 
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change the law to permit intercept evidence only if the necessary safeguards could be put 
in place to protect sensitive techniques and to ensure that the potential benefits outweigh 
the risks. A comprehensive review of intercept as evidence was conducted in 2003/4 
following a request from the Prime Minister in 2003. Following the review’s completion 
in 2004, the Government concluded that was not the right time to change the law and that 
the impact of new technology needed to be properly considered and factored into the 
decision making process. The then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, has indicated that 
favoured allowing intercept evidence to be used in court.199 So has a former Head of 
MI5.200 In the JCHR has heard substantial evidence on the arguments for using intercept 
intelligence.201 Its Report on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 days, 
intercept and post-charge questioning the JCHR welcomed in principle the 
Government’s review of the use of intercept as evidence. It remained convinced that the 
ability to use it would help bring more prosecutions against terrorists. It made 
recommendations on implementation and considered that the law of public interest 
immunity would protect the public interest in non-disclosure.202 The Government’ has 
proposed a Privy Council review into the use of this evidence in terror trials 
 
11.3 Longer Pre-Trial Detention  
 
On 25 July 2007, the Prime Minister announced new anti-terror measures, including 
proposals to extend this maximum limit for pre-trial detention to a possible 56 days  
(under the Terrorism Act (2000) the current limit is 28 days).  The human rights 
organization Liberty is strongly opposed to this.203 The JCHR is not convinced of the 
need for this and recommends thorough scrutiny of the evidence, stronger judicial 
safeguards and improved parliamentary oversight. The Committee considers that there 
should be an upper limit on pre-charge detention and that Parliament, not the courts, 
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should decide that limit after considering all the evidence.204 There is also a proposal to 
introduce a new police power to question suspects after charges have been brought, 
possibly with judicial and parliamentary oversight.205 This would allow for a charge to be 
replaced with a more appropriate offence at a later stage.  The context and purpose of 
detention are now understood differently. The evidence from the police to the HAC made 
clear that the interviewing of suspects had become virtually irrelevant: 
 
In general it cannot be expected that interviews of suspects during extended 
detention will lead to significant additional information that can be used in court. 
While we can understand that there may be cases in which confrontation of a 
suspect with new evidence might lead to admissions, it appears that the case for 
extended detention rests on two arguments: first, the need to seek and analyse 
evidence from a complex range of sources and, second, the need to ensure the 
protection of the public. This latter point has been referred to in our evidence and 
the Parliamentary debates. It does not, however, form any part of the legal basis 
for an application for extended detention.206 
 
The changed nature of terrorism means that arrests are used to disrupt conspiracies. As 
the HAC made clear, preventive detention is a significant new development but one that 
was not made explicit during the passage of the Bill, during which extended detention 
was primarily justified on the grounds of the time needed to collect and analyse 
evidence.207 One important aspect of this was whether the nature and role of judicial 
oversight needed to be modified. The HAC was uneasy at the prospect of the existing 
system being used to provide judicial oversight of even longer pre-charge detention.208 It 
considered that the combination of pre-charge detention for up to four weeks with ‘a vast 
amount’ of arrests leading to detention intended to disrupt or prevent terrorist activity 
meant that new forms of judicial oversight were needed.209 Lord Carlile had 
recommended a strengthened system of judicial oversight once a suspect has been 
arrested.210 The government’s response to the HAC’s proposals was lukewarm.211 
 
11.3 Deportations 
 
The governments preferred policy is to deport foreign nationals who are a security risk. 
In some cases ECHR jurisprudence prevents this. One UK strategy has been to supppor 
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an attempt to revise rather than reverse the ECHR jurisprudence stemming from the 
Chahal case.212 The second has been to seek to deport on bases of Memornadums of 
understanding or assurances from the foreign governments concerned, e.g. Libya, 
Algeria. The argument is that the assurances reduce the real risk of a violation of Article 
3 ECHR. The argument has been accepted by the courts in principle.213 Argument is now 
focused on the quality of the assurances.214 Of course, this strategy is not open in respect 
of UK nationals.  
 
11.4 Derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR 
 
The possibility of this has been raised by the Government. In 2007 the relevant Minister’s 
statement on control orders stated that, ‘We will consider other options – including 
derogation – if we have exhausted ways of overturning previous judgments on this 
issue’.215 A nuclear option would be to denounce the ECHR. 
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